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**UNIVERSITY  
OF BERN**

# **BF-CBOM: Uncovering Cryptographic Assets Through Comparative CBOM Analysis at Scale**



Roman Bögli, Jonas Spieler, Timo Kehrer

Software Engineering Group (SEG), University of Bern, Switzerland

ICPC'26, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

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# Prologue



Information Technology Laboratory

**COMPUTER SECURITY RESOURCE CENTER**


**NIST** | COMPUTER SECURITY  
RESOURCE CENTER  
CSRC

# **Announcing Approval of Three Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) for Post-Quantum Cryptography**

August 13, 2024

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
Protagonist



```

"components": [ {
  "name": "RSA-2048",
  "type": "cryptographic-asset",
  "bom-ref": "crypto/key/rsa-2048@1.2.840.113549.1.1.1",
  "cryptoProperties": {
    "assetType": "related-crypto-material",
    "relatedCryptoMaterialProperties": {
      "type": "public-key",
      "id": "2e9ef09e-dfac-4526-96b4-d02f31af1b22",
      "state": "active",
      "size": 2048,
      "algorithmRef": "crypto/algorithm/rsa-2048@1.2.840.113549.1.1.1",
      "securedBy": {
        "mechanism": "Software",
        "algorithmRef": "crypto/algorithm/aes-128-gcm@2.16.840.1.101.3.4.1.6"
      },
      "creationDate": "2016-11-21T08:00:00Z",
      "activationDate": "2016-11-21T08:20:00Z"
    },
    "oid": "1.2.840.113549.1.1.1"
  }
}, {
  "name": "RSA-2048",
  "type": "cryptographic-asset",
  "bom-ref": "crypto/algorithm/rsa-2048@1.2.840.113549.1.1.1",
  "cryptoProperties": { ... }
}, {
  "name": "AES-128-GCM",
  "type": "cryptographic-asset"
}

```



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BF-CBOM (our tool)

## batch-generate CBOMs

## Execution

Select benchmark

walk-through-1 · 81b0a51e · running

## walk-through-1

ID: 81b0a51e-5c98-4857-b435-20d02cb35fd6

Created: 2025-09-25T19:46:28Z · Jobs: 40

repo	info	URL	cbomkit	cdxgen	cryptobomforge	deepseek
hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam	Python ·  73,334 ·  155,846 KB		43.0s · 0.6 KB	20.1s · 16.4 KB	Failed	42.5s · 2.2 KB
Shubhamsaboo/awesome-llm-apps	Python ·  70,113 ·  191,934 KB		28.3s · 0.7 KB	20.9s · 819.3 KB	82.2s · 9.7 KB	30.3s · 1.6 KB
binary-husky/gpt_academic	Python ·  69,255 ·  72,551 KB		20.3s · 0.7 KB	17.0s · 63.9 KB	106.5s · 6.6 KB	73.9s · 3.3 KB
ansible/ansible	Python ·  66,543 ·  261,157 KB		Timeout	11.4s · 34.0 KB	306.7s · 5.6 KB	Timeout
xtekky/gpt4free	Python ·  65,151 ·  169,838 KB		Timeout	5.4s · 198.6 KB	91.6s · 14.3 KB	89.3s · 4.6 KB
jeecgboot/JeecgBoot	Java ·  43,961 ·  80,062 KB				Failed	

Completed 32/40

Show analysis

Cancel

## Notes

- Pending: job queued or running.
- Completed: worker returned a CBOM successfully.
- Failed: worker errored while processing the repo.
- Timeout: worker exceeded its time budget.
- Cancelled: job was cancelled before completion.

## batch-generate CBOMs


repo	cbomkit	cdxgen	cryptobomforge	deepseek
hacksider/Deep-Live-Cam	✓ 43.0s · 0.6 KB	✓ 20.1s · 16.4 KB	✖ Failed	✓ 42.5s · 2.2 KB
Shubhamsaboo/awesome-llm-apps	✓ 28.3s · 0.7 KB	✓ 20.9s · 819.3 KB	✓ 82.2s · 9.7 KB	✓ 30.3s · 1.6 KB
binary-husky/gpt_academic	✓ 20.3s · 0.7 KB	✓ 17.0s · 63.9 KB	✓ 106.5s · 6.6 KB	✓ 73.9s · 3.3 KB
ansible/ansible	🕒 Timeout	✓ 11.4s · 34.0 KB	✓ 306.7s · 5.6 KB	🕒 Timeout
xtekky/gpt4free	🕒 Timeout	✓ 5.4s · 198.6 KB	✓ 91.6s · 14.3 KB	✓ 89.3s · 4.6 KB
jeecgboot/JeecgBoot	zzz	zzz	✖ Failed	zzz

## analyze &amp; visualize


## Job Runtime Summary

Worker  
● cbomkit  
● cryptobomforge  
● deepseek

○ Repository size (KB)



○ Reported components



## explore &amp; compare

cbomkit component #16

```
{
  "name" : "Blowfish"
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "bom-ref" : "db5ec993-eef9-42df-ac5b-99abe16e7c1d"
  "evidence" : {
    "occurrences" : [
      0 : {
        "line" : 29
        "offset" : 18
        "location" :
          "chat2db-server/chat2db-server-web/chat2db-
          server-web-api/src/main/java/ai/chat2db/
          server/web/api/controller/ncx/cipher/
          Navicat11Cipher.java"
        "additionalContext" :
          "javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec#<init>([Ljava/
          lang/String;)V"
```

cdxgen component #1791

```
{
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "name" : "blowfishECB"
  "bom-ref" :
    "crypto/algorithm/blowfishECB@1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.1.1"
  "description" : "cryptlib encryption algorithm"
  "cryptoProperties" : {
    "assetType" : "algorithm"
    "oid" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.1.1"
  }
  "tags" : [
    0 : "cryptographic-asset"
  ]
}
```

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explore & compare

```
▼ {
  "name" : "Blowfish"
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "bom-ref" : "db5ec993-eef9-42df"
  ▼ "evidence" : {
    ▼ "occurrences" : [
      ▼ 0 : {
        "line" : 29
        "offset" : 18
```

```
▼ {
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "name" : "blowfishECB"
  "bom-ref" :
  "crypto/algorithm/blowfishECB@1
  "description" : "cryptlib encry
  ▼ "cryptoProperties" : {
    "assetType" : "algorithm"
    "oid" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.1
```

$u^b$

explore & compare

```
▼ {
  "name" : "Blowfish"
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "bom-ref" : "db5ec993-eef9-42df"
  ▼ "evidence" : {
    ▼ "occurrences" : [
      ▼ 0 : {
        "line" : 29
        "offset" : 18
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

```
▼ {
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"
  "name" : "blowfishECB"
  "bom-ref" :
  "crypto/algorithm/blowfishECB@1"
  "description" : "cryptlib encry"
  ▼ "cryptoProperties" : {
    "assetType" : "algorithm"
    "oid" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.1"
  }
}
```

$u^b$

explore & compare

```
▼ "evidence" : {  
  ▼ "occurrences" : [  
    ▼ 0 : {  
      "line" : 29  
      "offset" : 18  
      "location" :  
      "chat2db-server/chat2db-server-web-api/src/main/server/web/api/controller/Navicat11Cipher.java"
```

```
{  
  "type" : "cryptographic-asset"  
  "name" : "blowfishECB"  
  "bom-ref" :  
  "crypto/algorithm/blowfishECB@1.3.6.1.4.1.3029."  
  "description" : "cryptlib encryption algorithm"  
  ▼ "cryptoProperties" : {  
    "assetType" : "algorithm"  
    "oid" : "1.3.6.1.4.1.3029.1.1.1"  
  }  
  ▼ "tags" : [  
    0 : "cryptographic-asset"  
  ]  
}
```

???

## BF-CBOM: Uncovering Cryptographic Assets Through Comparative CBOM Analysis at Scale

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### Abstract

The advancing threat of quantum-capable adversaries accelerates the need to locate and replace vulnerable cryptographic assets in software systems. To support this transition, Cryptography Bills of Materials (CBOMs) are becoming essential for inventorying the cryptographic footprint of software systems as increasingly demanded by regulators in critical domains. While first CBOM generation tools have emerged, they still lack reliable means to comprehend and analyze the cryptographic landscape of codebases.

We present BF-CBOM, a first-of-its-kind framework for orchestrating various CBOM generators and analyzing their outputs, enabling holistic comprehension of the cryptographic posture of software projects. BF-CBOM offers a containerized environment designed to accommodate the heterogeneous toolchains of such generators, executes them on GitHub code repositories, and aggregates their outputs for comparative investigation in a unified analysis layer. Our preliminary study reveals striking discrepancies between generated CBOMs, underscoring the need for systematic evaluation. BF-CBOM supports researchers with cryptographic reports, practitioners through CI/CD integration, and tool developers by providing performance feedback relative to other CBOM generators. A demonstration video is available at [youtu.be/-YdBPHsyymU](https://youtu.be/-YdBPHsyymU).

### Keywords

CBOM, software analysis, cryptography, post-quantum, security


### ACM Reference Format:

Roman Bögli, Jonas Spieler, and Timo Kehrer. 2026. BF-CBOM: Uncovering Cryptographic Assets Through Comparative CBOM Analysis at Scale. In *34th IEEE/ACM International Conference on Program Comprehension (ICPC '26)*, April 12–13, 2026, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. ACM, New York, USA, 5 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3794763.3794831>

quantum computing, however, these mitigation measures demand even greater attention. When sufficiently powerful quantum computers become available, they could rapidly render current, classical cryptographic algorithms insecure [5, 14] using long-known quantum algorithms [40, 41]. In response to this disruption, the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization project has defined new algorithmic standards as of August 2024 [22].

However, new quantum-secure standards are not enough. The focus now shifts to organizations, which must identify and assess their cryptographic posture across their software landscape to plan appropriate action [18, 19, 21]. Systems must also remain adaptable to evolving cryptographic needs, a property known as *cryptographic agility* [25, 27, 28]. To achieve crypto-agility at scale, organizations require an interoperable, machine-readable inventory of cryptographically relevant information that can be automatically generated and audited [36]. At the heart of this effort are *Cryptography Bills of Materials* (CBOMs) [8, 26] – structured object models that describe cryptographic components and their dependencies within software systems. CBOMs extend SBOMs to the cryptographic domain, providing foundational inventory capabilities necessary for PQC migration, i.e., the assessment and systematic replacement or augmentation of classical cryptographic primitives in software systems with quantum-resistant alternatives.

Yet producing high-quality CBOMs is substantially more difficult than generating SBOMs. Cryptography-related information is scattered across code and third-party libraries, often hidden in configuration files or runtime artifacts such as certificates, keys, and protocol settings – all frequently undocumented or context-dependent. Although first CBOM generators [7, 30, 35] and standardization efforts such as CycloneDX [26] have emerged, their reliability and coverage remain entirely unexplored. No systematic approach exists to assess how comprehensively these generators



BF-CBOM: Your Best Friend for  
Cryptography Bill of Materials (DEMO)  
20M views • 4 months ago



Roman Bögli

<https://py.md/besLc>

<https://py.md/QzsZ5>



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
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
# Appendix

# BF-CBOM's System Architecture



# CBOM Generation Techniques

- Current CBOM generators are quite trivial and mostly static




- Detecting cryptographic assets on runtime demands academic attention



“extended Berkeley Packet Filter”, i.e., sandboxed Linux kernel interface for efficient, low-overhead runtime tracing

W. Dan, «Dynamic CBOM: A Survey of Cryptographic Bill of Materials Generation and a Runtime Proof-of-Concept», Master’s Thesis, University of Bern, 2026.

# IBM's CBOMKit



**PQCA/cbomkit**

A toolset for dealing with Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM)

cryptography
post-quantum-cryptography

quantum-safe
post-quantum
sbom

Java
☆ 34
Updated 3 hours ago

IBM, CBOMkit. GitHub. <https://github.com/PQCA/cbomkit>


IBM Research | CBOMkit

pkg:github/bisq-network/bisq@d52a307?branch=master


34 cryptographic assets found.

gitUrl: <https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq> revision: master commit: d52a307


⚠ **Not compliant** – This CBOM does not comply with the policy "quantum\_safe".  
Source: Basic Backend Compliance Service




34  
Crypto Assets



17 types of crypto assets



6  
Crypto Primitives



5  
Crypto Functions

Legend for Crypto Assets: Not Applicable (grey), Unknown (blue), Not Quantum Safe (yellow), Quantum Safe (green)

Legend for Crypto Primitives: Hash (purple), Signature (light blue), Block-cipher (dark green), Other (red), Pke (pink), Mac (black)

Legend for Crypto Functions: Keygen (purple), Digest (light blue), Sign (dark green), Encapsulate (pink), Tag (black)


**List of all assets** Download CBOM

Cryptographic asset	Type	Primitive	Location
🔍 MGF1	Algorithm	Other	<a href="#">Encryption.java:193</a>
🔍 MGF1	Algorithm	Other	<a href="#">Encryption.java:206</a>
-- SHA1	Algorithm	Hash Function	<a href="#">PeerInfoIcon.java:89</a>

# Comparative Results (1/3)

Table 5.1: Amount of Empty CBOMs per Tool


Tool	Repos	Non-Empty	Empty	Empty %
CBOMkit	100	59	41	41.0%
cdxgen	99	67	32	32.3%
DeepSeek	100	87	13	13.0%



# Comparative Results (2/3)

Table 5.2: Amount of Components per Repository


<b>Tool</b>	<b>Total Comp.</b>	<b>Avg/Repo</b>	<b>Avg/Non-Empty</b>
CBOMkit	2'327	23.3	39.4
cdxgen	38'354	387.4	572.4
DeepSeek	516	5.2	5.9




# Comparative Results (3/3)

Table 5.3: Component Type Distribution

Component Type	CBOMkit	cdxgen	DeepSeek
algorithm	323	0	0
framework	0	16'845	0
library	0	21'509	516
protocol	25	0	0
related-crypto-material	1'979	0	0



# Google Trends



See [online](#)

**Interest over time:** Numbers represent search interest relative to the highest point on the chart for the given region and time. A value of 100 is the peak popularity for the term. A value of 50 means that the term is half as popular. A score of 0 means that there was not enough data for this term.

# Challenges

- How does our **IT infrastructure** look like?
  - Which software components run where and how do they interact?
  - Which internal/external parties are involved?
  - Who and/or what has what kind of user rights on what?
- How does our **cryptographic posture** look like?
  - Where and how is what kind of data stored?
  - Which cryptographic assets/primitives are where in use?
  - How do the thread models look like on these cryptographic point of interests?
- How can we become **cryptographically agile**?
  - What needs where to be done to seamlessly transition between primitives?
  - How, where, and when shall we move towards post-quantum cryptography?


# Crypto-Agility as Broader Topic

## 1.3 The Need for Research

The complex challenge of migrating our global compute infrastructure to new public-key cryptography standards will involve work on many levels, and we argue that *the area overall is in dire need of research*. That is, before the global industry ecosystem can deploy quantum safe solutions, there is considerable work to be done understanding migration challenges and schemes, and more rigorously addressing integration, security, performance, agility, and other challenges.

D. Ott, C. Peikert, and other workshop participants, "Identifying Research Challenges in Post Quantum Cryptography Migration and Cryptographic Agility." arXiv, Sep. 16, 2019. doi: [10.48550/arXiv.1909.07353](https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.07353).

In many ways, cryptographic agility represents the generalization of PQC migration in that it considers not just the current challenge of migrating from our current algorithms to PQC alternatives, but the longer-term need for ongoing migrations as new attacks and better algorithms motivate the need for updates in our cryptographic standards.




# CycloneDX

- “CycloneDX v1.6 simplifies the discovery, management, and reporting of cryptographic assets, laying the groundwork for migration to quantum-safe systems and applications. It facilitates the identification of weak cryptographic algorithms, promotes cryptographic agility, and ensures compliance with evolving cryptographic policies and advisories like CNSA 2.0, aligning with recommendations from NIST.”
- “CBOM is the first open standard to describe an organizations’ cryptographic assets inventory, and their dependencies, giving organizations deeper visibility into the cryptography they use, enabling them to assess their quantum readiness, and to consider actionable steps towards becoming quantum safe.”


S. Springett, “CycloneDX v1.6 Released, Advances Software Supply Chain Security with Cryptographic Bill of Materials and Attestations,” OWASP. Accessed: Apr. 10, 2024. [Online]. Available: <https://owasp.org/blog/2024/04/09/CycloneDX-v1.6-Released.html>

# CycloneDX's CBOM Standard




OWASP, "Authoritative Guide to CBOM: Implement Cryptography Bill of Materials for Post-Quantum Systems and Applications," CycloneDX Feature Working Group on Cryptography, First Edition, Apr. 2024.


# Notable Publications (1/3)



M. Campagna et al., “Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security: An introduction, benefits, enablers and challenges,” European Telecommunications Standards Institute, vol. 8, pp. 1–64, 2015.



R. Niederhagen and M. Waidner, “Practical post-quantum cryptography,” Fraunhofer SIT, 2017, [Online].



D. Ott, C. Peikert, and other workshop participants, “Identifying Research Challenges in Post Quantum Cryptography Migration and Cryptographic Agility.” arXiv, Sep. 16, 2019. doi: [10.48550/arXiv.1909.07353](https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.07353).

# Notable Publications (2/3)

NIST Cybersecurity White Paper csrc.nist.gov

## Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography:

### Exploring Challenges Associated with Adopting and Using Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

William Barker  
Dakota Consulting  
Gaithersburg, MD

William Polk  
Applied Cybersecurity Division  
Information Technology Laboratory

Murugiah Souppaya  
Computer Security Division  
Information Technology Laboratory

April 28, 2021

This publication is available free of charge from:  
<https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04282021>

**NIST**  
National Institute of  
Standards and Technology  
U.S. Department of Commerce

W. Barker, W. Polk, and M. Souppaya, "Getting Ready for Post-Quantum Cryptography: Explore Challenges Associated with Adoption and Use of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms," The Publications of NIST Cyber Security White Paper (DRAFT), CSRC, NIST, GOV, vol. 26, 2020, [Online].

Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik

## Migration zu Post-Quanten-Kryptografie

Handlungsempfehlungen des BSI

Stand: August 2020

BSI, "Migration zu Post-Quanten-Kryptografie," Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI), Bonn, Aug. 2020. [Online].

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Perspective | Published: 11 May 2022

## Transitioning organizations to post-quantum cryptography

David Joseph , Rafaël Misoczki, Marc Manzano, Joe Tricot, Fernando Dominguez Pinuaga, Olivier Lacombe, Stefan Leichenauer, Jack Hidary, Phil Venables & Royal Hansen

Nature 605, 237–243 (2022) | [Cite this article](#)

9582 Accesses | 49 Citations | 133 Altmetric | [Metrics](#)

### Abstract

Quantum computers are expected to break modern public key cryptography owing to Shor's algorithm. As a result, these cryptosystems need to be replaced by quantum-resistant algorithms, also known as post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms. The PQC research field has flourished over the past two decades, leading to the creation of a large variety of algorithms that are expected to be resistant to quantum attacks. These PQC algorithms are being selected and standardized by several standardization bodies. However, even with the guidance from these important efforts, the danger is not gone: there are billions of old and new devices that need to transition to the PQC suite of algorithms, leading to a multidecade transition process that has to account for aspects such as security, algorithm performance, ease of secure implementation, compliance and more. Here we present an organizational perspective of the PQC transition. We discuss transition timelines, leading strategies to protect systems against quantum attacks, and approaches for combining pre-quantum cryptography with PQC to minimize transition risks. We suggest standards to start experimenting with now and provide a series of other recommendations to allow organizations to achieve a smooth and timely PQC transition.

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# Notable Publications (3/3)

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# Terminology

Cryptographic Agility (crypto-agility)	Ability to switch between multiple cryptographic primitives, enabling rapid adaptations of new cryptographic algorithms without making disruptive system changes.	[0]
Software Bill of Materials (SBOM)	Object model to what is inside a software. Helps stakeholders to keep track of software components and dependencies for better software supply chain security.	[1]
Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP)	Non-profit foundation that works to improve the security of software.	[2]
CycloneDX	A standardized and machine-readable format for capturing the components that comprise software (SBOM), hardware (HBOM), services (SaaSOM), AI/ML models (AI/ML-BOM), and cryptography (CBOM).	[3] [4]
Cryptography Bill of Materials (CBOM)	Object model to describe cryptographic assets and their dependencies. CBOM is an extension of the CycloneDX standard for SBOMs	[5] [6]

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